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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15328

-vsROBERT GLEN BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with the crimes of theft
by receiving, theft by deception, and selling a motor vehicle
with an altered vehicle identification number in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408, 76-6-405, and 41-1-120 (1953), as
amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by jury, the Honorable James
Sawaya, District Judge, presiding.

s.

The jury returned a verdict

of guilty as to all three counts, and the court placed appellant
on probation on condition he serve six months in the county jail
and make full restitution to the victim.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 14, 1976, a bronze and white, threequarter ton, 1974 Chevrolet pickup truck was stolen from
Marvin J. Butler (T.8-9).

On November 4, 1976, Jesse Labrum

sold the appellant a wrecked 1974 half-ton Chevrolet pickup
truck without cab, bed, or engine (T.22-25,32).

As part of

the sale, the witness Labrum delivered a certificate of title
to the appellant bearing the name Robert Greene (T.34-35).
The appellant sold Larry Lindsay a 1974 Chevrolet pickup
truck (T.53-54).

The appellant described the truck as a half·

ton truck, but i t was actually a three-quarter ton truck
(T.67).

As part of the sale, appellant delivered to Lindsay

a certificate of title for a one-half ton pickup truck bearin~
the name of Robert Greene (T.55-56).

On November 15, 1976,

Marvin Butler observed a truck in the yard of the Lindsay
home, and identified it as the truck stolen from him (T.9-10).
The Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) had been ground off
of the engine, and a plate bearing the VIN had been rem~~
from the left door frame

(T.11-12).

A fictitious, hand-sta~re
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VIN had been placed on the engine (T.80).

Hal Vincent, a

Special Agent of the National Automobile Theft Bureau,
determined that the vehicle's original VIN identified
the truck as the one stolen from Butler, and that the
fictitious VIN stamped on the engine matched the VIN of
the wrecked truck appellant had purchased from Labrum (T.80-

81, 86-87).

At trial, the defense theory of the case was

that the appellant was innocently involved with the criminal
actions of his son (T.105).

In rebuttal, the State presented

evidence that appellant had purchased a wrecked 1976 Granada
from Labrum (T.201).
Mortensen (T.208).

A 1976 Granada was stolen from Gunnar
When the stolen car was recovered, it

was determined that certain parts had been replaced from
the wreck owned by the appellant so that it would appear
that the stolen car's VIN was the VIN of the wrecked car
owned by the appellant (T.212-213).

It was also established

that appellant had sold a 1976 Granada to his mother (T.135136).

Appellant objected to the introduction of this
evidence on rebuttal

(T.200).
ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF
ANOTHER CRIMINAL ACT.
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55, provides that
evidence of the corrunission of a crime is admissible when
relevant to prove intent, knowledge or absence of mistake
or accident.

In this case, appellant claims that his

involvement with the stolen truck was wholly innocent,
without guilty knowledge or criminal intent, and that his
son was the true culprit.

By raising this defense, appellant

had clearly put into issue his own knowledge and intent, and
evidence tending to prove the commission of another offense
would therefore be properly admitted if it tended to prove
criminal intent or knowledge.

The criminal act with which

appellant was charged is the theft of a truck, the sale of
a stolen truck, and the attempt to conceal the crime by
altering the VIN of the stolen

truck to match that of a

wrecked vehicle owned by the appellant.

Evidence of an

offense extrinsic to the offense charged was offered by the
State that tended to establish the theft of a car,

the

sale of a stolen car, and an attempt to conceal the crime
by replacing parts bearing VIN numbers on the stolen car
with parts from a wrecked car purchased by the appellant.
Both criminal acts

(the charged offense and the extrinsic

offense) reveal a strikingly similar modus operandi, and
evidence that appellant was involved in one act is probatiff !
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of his criminal intent in the other.

The evidence of the

extrinsic offense was probative on a relevant issue and
therefore admissible.
The authority cited by appellant is readily
distinguishable.

Appellant has cited a group of federal

circuit court cases for the proposition that a high standard
of similarity must be met before evidence of extrinsic offenses
can be admitted.

Assuming that this high standard is applicable

in this State, respondent submits that an examination of the
facts in those cases shows that the standard has been met here.
In United States 'v. Spica, 413 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1969), the
court held that evidence that defendant cashed other stolen
checks was admissible to prove that defendant transported a
stolen check in interstate commerce.

In United States v.

Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1977), the Court held that
evidence that defendant possessed credit cards not in his
own name was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense
of stealing a silver dollar from the mails to be admissible.
In Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1956),
defendant was charged with fraud in the mail order of
geraniums.

The court held that an earlier transaction which

occurred more than five years prior to the charged offense,
where several customers complained that defendant was dilatory

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

in forwarding tulip bulbs and refunds, was not sufficiently
related to the charged offense to be admissible.

Finally,

in United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973),
the court held that evidence that the defendant endorsed
other securities was not sufficiently related to the charge
of transporting forged securities to be admissible.

The

court intimated that if the government could prove encashrnent
or passing of the other securities they would be
Broadway at 995.

admissib~.

Judge Gee has observed that Broadway is the

"most extreme" Fifth Circuit case imposing restrictions on the
admission of extrinsic offense evidence.
Beechum, supra at 509

United States v.

(Gee, J. dissenting).

A serious argu-

ment can be made that the Broadway "clear and convincing"
standard is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Beechum at 514 (Gee, J. dissenting) •

Assuming, however, that

the Broadway standard is applicable to this case, respondent
submits that the similarity between the charged offense and
the extrinsic offense is clear and convincing, and evidence
of the extrinsic evidence was properly admitted on rebuttal.
Assuming that the clear and convincing standard
had not been met in this case, respondent avers that ~
theshold requirements to the admission of extrinsic offense
evidence is not the law of this jurisdiction.

Rule 55 of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

Utah Rules of Evidence contains no threshold requirements
for admission of extrinsic offense evidence other than
relevancy to a material fact.

In State v. Schieving, 535

P.2d 1233 (Utah 1975), this Court held that when a defendant
has been charged with mishandling public money, evidence of
other shortages within the defendant's department are
admissible even though it has not been shown how those
shortages occurred.

In Schieving, this Court upheld the

admission of evidence that the defendant had committed
other crimes than the one charged when that evidence was
relevant to prove a material fact without imposing further
restrictions on the admissiblity of the evidence.

Evidence

that appellant was involved in the Granada transaction was
probative of his claim that his involvement with the pickup
was without criminal intent or guilty knowledge.

Because

evidence of the Granada offense was probative of a material
fact, the evidence was properly admitted under Schieving,
supra.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the court below did not
err in admitting evidence of an offense other than the
offense charged because the evidence was probative of a
material fact.

The charged offense and the extrinsic offense
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were similar enough that the probative value outweighed any
prejudice to the appellant.

Appellant's conviction should

be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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